In this Paper an appraisal of the law and practice relating to Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania is done. It is presented that the laws installing the doctrine of Independence of the Judiciary; the legal principles which safeguard and uphold it; challenges facing the implementation of the doctrine and finally a recommendation to take off from the challenges is offered. In the paper, it is maintained that the laws and legal principles purportedly crafted to install, safeguard and uphold the doctrine of Independence of the Judiciary are a mere sham. Such principles as those: that limit the involvement of the Executive arm of the government in the remuneration of the members of the judiciary; that are on the security of tenure of the judicial officers (judges); that relieve judicial officers from personal liabilities for actions and omissions arising in the course of their performance of duties, establishment and modus operandi of both the Judiciary Fund and the Judicial Service Commission and the doctrine of presumption of innocence, are all inadequate. The executive arm of the government through powers vested upon it and to be exercised over the Judiciary can still encroach upon the doctrine of Independence of the Judiciary. The powers to appointing and removal of the judges from office; appointment and removal of the Chief Justice by the President, funding of the Judiciary by the Executive; interests of the judiciary and the personal interests of the judges; the functioning of the Judicial Ethics Committees and the appointment of the Chief Court Administrator actually paralyse the Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania.
In this Paper, it is argued, therefore that, though it is not expected for the doctrine to operate in the environment that supports it at a hundred per cent but the checks, if any, on the judiciary should sparingly be done at least not to completely distort the essence of the existence of the doctrine itself.
