Case Comment on ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla

CASE COMMENT: ADM JABALPUR v. SHIVKANT SHUKLA

Written by Vidit Mehra

2nd Year of 3 Year LL.B. Student, Symbiosis Law School, Pune

 

Citation:

(1976) 2 SCC 521; AIR 1976 SC 1207

Bench:

Ray, A.N. (Cj), Khanna, Hans Raj, Beg, M. Hameedullah, Chandrachud, Y.V., Bhagwati, P.N.

 

Introduction-

The said case pertains to the time of Proclamation of Emergency by the then ruling government of Indira Gandhi and Presidential order of the same was issued when election of Indira Gandhi were termed to be illegal. The case arose out of a contention that whether the right of a person to approach respective High Court gets quashed when his fundamental rights are not given or suppressed, especially Article 14, and 21 during the emergency and enforcement of such rights remain suspended for the period of Proclamation of Emergency in force. The judgment was delivered on April 28th, 1976 by the Constitutional bench of five judges including the then Chief Justice A.N. Ray, out of which four were in favour of suspension of such right and liberty and one dissenting rejected such contention. As far as majority of the judgment goes, it was established that a person’s right to approach High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution for Habeas Corpus or any other writ challenging the legality of an order of detention at the time of Proclamation of Emergency remains suspended and that person cannot approach any High Court for the remedy or get his right. This case was infamously called as Habeas Corpus case. Till date, the decision taken by the Court holds badly on the ground of equity, justice and good conscious. The Latin term Habeas Corpus means “you may have the body” and writ of securing a person’s liberty is called Habeas Corpus.

Historical Background and Facts-

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain[1], the election of Indira Gandhi from Lok Sabha was challenged by petitioner on the grounds of corruption from her constituency, Rae Barelli. On June 12, 1975, Justice Sinha held Indira Gandhi guilty and declared her election invalid. After this judgment, Indira Gandhi moved to Supreme Court and asked for conditional stay on the decision of High Court. This made her handicapped on the floor of Parliament and she was losing her political footprint. The opposition on the other hand became powerful which made Indira Gandhi to declare Emergency under Clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution through the then President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and the Emergency was termed as serious due to “internal disturbance”. During that period, India suffered a war with Pakistan and faced drought which turned economy bad in shape. After the proclamation of Emergency, the fundamental rights under Article 14, and 21 remained suspended and proceedings pending in Court concerned with enforcement of these Articles remain suspended for the period of Emergency. Any person who was considered to be a political threat or anyone who could voice his opinion politically was detained without trial under Preventive Detention Laws. This situation led to arrest of several opposition leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Jay Prakash Narain, Morarji Desai and L.K. Advani under MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act) because they were proving to be a political threat to Indira Gandhi. These leaders then filed petitions in several High Courts challenging the arrest. Many High Courts ruled in favour of these petitions which made Indira Gandhi government to approach the Supreme Court on this issue which infamously became Additional District Magistrate Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla. It is also called as Habeas Corpus because usually this is the writ filed in Court when a person is arrested. At the time of Proclamation of Emergency, this writ was not entertained as Rights under Article 21 remained suspended.

Issues-

The issues in the said case were-

  • Whether, under Proclamation of Emergency after President’s order, can the writ of Habeas Corpus be maintained in High Court by a person challenging his unlawful detention?
  • Was suspension of Article 21 fit under rule of law?
  • Does detenue hold locus standi in Court during the period of Emergency?

Rules-

Upon the issues, it was discussed by the State that the only purpose of Emergency in the Constitution is to guarantee special power to the Executive machinery which can hold discretion over the implementation of law and whatever State considers, it shall be held valid. Filing writ petition in High Courts under Article 226 are suspended and petitioners had no right to approach the Court for the implementation of the same and this would have logically dismissed such petitions. The fact that Emergency provisions in Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution including Article 358, Article 359(1) and Article 359(1A) are necessities in regard to economy and military security of the State. The validity of the law under Presidential Order cannot be challenged on the ground of violating fundamental rights which were suspended by such order. This answers all the issues like “Whether, under Proclamation of Emergency after President’s order, can the writ of Habeas Corpus be maintained in High Court by a person challenging his unlawful detention” for which the answer is No, one cannot approach the High Court for restoration of his fundamental right under any Article of the Indian Constitution. Upon the issue of locus standi, the petitioner holds no ground for any relief.

Judgment-

In view of the Presidential order dated 27 June 1975 no person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an, order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by malafides factual or legal or is based on extraneous consideration.

  1. Section 16A (9) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act is constitutionally valid;
  2. The appeals are accepted. The judgments are set aside;
  3. The petitions before the High Courts are now to be disposed of in accordance with the law laid down in these appeals.

The above said judgement was given by four out of five judges. They were the then Chief Justice A.N. Ray, along with Justices M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati. The dissenting Judgment was given by Justice Khanna who ended his judgment by saying “As observed by Chief Justice Huges, Judges are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice. A dissent in a Court of last resort, to use his words, is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possible correct the error into which the dissenting Judge believes the court to have been betrayed.” He paid the price of his opinion when his junior M.H. Beg was appointed as Chief Justice bypassing him in seniority. In M.M. Damnoo v. State of J&K[2]  the Court required the State Government to produce the file confining the grounds of detention so that the Court could satisfy itself That “the grounds on which the detenu has been detained have relevance to the security of the State”. It would, therefore, be seen that if there is a legislative provision which prohibits disclosure of the grounds, information and materials on which the order of detention is based and prevents the Court from calling for the production of such grounds, information and materials, it would obstruct and retard the exercise of the constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 and would be void as offending that Article.

Analysis-

Upon the analysis of the judgment, there are multiple observations on the given case. The Supreme Court in this case observed that Article 21 covers right to life and personal liberty against its illegal deprivation by the State and in case of suspension of Article 21 by Emergency under Article 359, the Court cannot question the authority or legality of such State’s decision. Article 358 is much wider than the Article 359 as fundamental rights are suspended as whole whereas Article 359 does not suspend any rights. Even being Emergency provisions under Article 359 (1) grants special power and status to the Executive, it does not undermine the essential components of sovereignty of separation of powers, leading to a system of check and balance and limited power of the Executive. The nexus between State and Executive is erroneous and the effect of suspension of such rights will only result in extra power to legislature which might create laws against fundamental rights. This act should not be considered as a “power” of the Executive or right of it. There is a legal extent till which a State can act in or against the citizens and in this case, it was high misuse of power of personal political gain of a single person. During Emergency, it is nowhere mentioned that the power of State “increases” from its original power under Article 162. Also, State only holds the right of arrest if the alleged act falls under Section 3 of MISA and its every condition is fulfilled. If any condition is unfulfilled then detention is beyond the power of State. The decision by the Supreme Court is said to be the biggest erroneous judgment till date. The dissenting opinion of Justice Khanna still holds more value than the majority judgment including the then Chief Justice. The wrong intent of Indira Gandhi’s government was seen when Justice Khanna was to ask the first uncomfortable question. “Life is also mentioned in Article 21 and would Government argument extend to it also?” There was no escape. Without batting an eyelid Niren De answered, ‘Even if life was taken away illegally, courts are helpless’. Before Proclamation of Emergency there was strong political instability in the Country after the Lok Sabha election of Indira Gandhi was termed as illegal. This whole exercise was to put opposition under pressure and during the process, even Supreme Court made major errors in the judgement and it can be said to be purely unconstitutional. Only the courage of single judge is said to be worth reading and it was in favour of humanity and liberty. Justice Bhagwati was quoted as “I have always leaned in favour of upholding personal liberty, for, I believe, it is one of the most cherished values of mankind, without it life would not be worth living. It is one of the pillars of free democratic society. Men have readily laid down their lives at its altar, in order to secure it, protect it and preserve it. But I do not think it would be right for me to allow my love of personal liberty to cloud my vision or to persuade me to place on the relevant provision of the Constitution a construction which its language cannot reasonably bear.” The day when this judgment was pronounced, it was termed as “darkest day of the democracy” and it was matched with the regime and rise of Hitler. On top of all, this judgment did not favour rule of law. As a judge, the focus is on public benefit or on something which is good for population but this judgment seemed to favour only one person. The judgment in this case can be compared to the judgment of Raj Narain’s case where Indira Gandhi was given a clean chit by the Supreme Court after being held guilty by Allahabad High Court. One can say that common man’s trust on judiciary has been shaken by these two judgments which happened almost simultaneously. Justice Khanna solely relied on the judgment of Makkhan Singh v. State of Punjab[3] in which he noted: “If in challenging the validity of his detention order, the detenu is pleading any right outside the rights specified in the order, his right to move any court in that behalf is not suspended, because it is outside Article 359(1) and consequently outside the Presidential order itself. Let us take a case where a detenu has been detained in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act. In such a case, it may be open to the detenu to contend that his detention is illegal for the reason that the mandatory provisions of the Act have been contravened. Such a plea is outside Article 359(1) and tile right of the detenu to move for his release on such a ground cannot be affected by the Presidential order”. Suspension of Article 21 would simply mean deprivation of right of life and liberty and this is against the basic right along with the Articles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights of which India is a part. This single case became example of how four able judges of the apex court of the country made a blunder under the wrong influence of the wrong person. The Supreme Court violated all fundamental rights with that decision. It was the darkest hour of Indian judiciary which struck at the very heart of fundamental rights. All four judges with the exception of Justice Khanna went on to become Chief Justices of India. In 2011, Justice Bhagwati expressed regret by saying: “I was wrong. The majority judgment was not the correct judgment. If it was open to me to come to a fresh decision in that case, I would agree with what Justice Khanna did. I am sorry. I don’t know why I yielded to my colleagues. Initially, I was not in favour of the majority view. But ultimately, I don’t know why, I was persuaded to agree with them. I was a novice at that time, a young judge…I was handling this type of litigation for the first time. But it was an act of weakness on my part.” Such acceptance from the judge mean how grave the situation was that time and what impact it left on India. The apex court recalled the comment of former Chief Justice M N Venkatachalliah in the Khanna Memorial Lecture on February 25, 2009 that the majority decision in the Emergency case be “confined to the dustbin of history”[4].

Aftermath of the judgment-

Soon after the Emergency and all which was done for it were rejected by the majority of population in 1977, the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[5] changed the position and gave fundamental character to the right in Article 21 by establishing a link between Articles 14, 19 and 21 which was denied in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[6] particularly in respect of Articles 19 and 21. Both these Articles cannot be separated and not exclusive of each other. It was further contended that the object of Presidential order under Article 359 was to remove legal problems and it was easier to make laws against fundamental rights. The obligation of the government to act according to the law and suspension of Article 21 did not automatically entail the suspension of rule of law. Following Shivkant Shukla Case, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde[7] went one step further and held that Presidential order issued under Article 359 were not circumscribed by any limitation and their applicability was not dependent on fulfilment of any condition laid before. These order impose a blanket ban on any and every judicial enquiry into validity of an order depriving someone of his liberty, no matter how it originated whether from an order directing the detention or from an order laying down the condition of his detention. The majority view in the Shivkant Shukla case has been completely negatived by 44th Amendment of the Constitution as well as judicial interpretation and therefore, it is no more longer a law. Now the enforcement of Article 20 and 21 cannot be suspended in any situation and the Court observed that Article 21 binds not only the executive but also the legislature and thereby correcting Justice Khanna’s stance that suspension of Article 21 relieves the legislature of its constraints but not the executive which can never deprive a person of his life and liberty without the authority of law and such detention can be challenged on grounds indicated in Makhan Singh Case. Articles 352 and 359 have not been invoked since revocation of Proclamation of Emergency in 1971 and 1975 in early 1977. Also, 44th Amendment changed “internal disturbance” into “armed rebellion” and internal disturbance not amounting to armed rebellion would not be a ground to the issue of Proclamation of emergency. Many such provisions in 44th Amendment for proclamation of Emergency were made so that no government in future can misuse this provision of Constitution which was interpreted unconstitutionally by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion-

The Proclamation and arbitrary use of power by the State machinery and taking away the personal liberty of a number of people along with judicial stamp can be considered one of the most erroneous judgment till date. Supreme Court went on to elaborate the interpretation of Article 21 and introduced Public Interest Litigation to gain public legitimacy after it faced criticism over the judgment and damage it had done. The wrong interpretation led to infringement of fundamental rights on whims and fancy of a political figure that had her agenda to fulfil. While the judgment is said to be a mistake on many occasions by jurists and apex court, the ruling has not been overruled formally even after admitting the error. This was noted by the bench of Justice Ashok Ganguly and Justice Aftab Alam. In today’s context, Dicey’s Rule of Law which was explained by Justice Khanna holds much greater force than what it was in 1976. There has to be a clear overruling of this judgment so that theoretical nature of Rule of Law can be made clear along with its applicability to our justice system. Also, further provisions shall be made to ensure that no political agenda should overshadow justice and equity of citizens.

 

 

[1] 1975 AIR 865, 1975 SCR (3) 333

[2] 1972 AIR 963, 1972 SCR (2) 1014

[3] 1964 AIR 381, 1964 SCR (4) 797

[4] Supreme Court regrets Emergency era verdict,, The Times of India, (Jan 3, 2011, 4:38AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Supreme-Court-regrets-Emergency-era-verdict/articleshow/7206252.cms

[5] 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621

[6] 1950 AIR 27, 1950 SCR 88

[7] 1977 AIR 1027, 1977 SCR (2) 719

Case Comment: M. Karunanidhi v. Union Of India, 1979

CASE COMMENT: M. KARUNANIDHI V. UNION OF INDIA, 1979

Written by Gaurav Maharshi

4th Year B.Com LLB Student, Institute of Law Nirma University

 

 

Date:

20/2/1979

 

Citation:

1979 AIR 898.

 

Bench:

Fazalali, Syed Murtaza, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, N.L. Untwalia, R.S. Pathak.

 

Facts:

In 1973 the Madras Legislature had passed The Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 herein referred as State Act. This Act was passed after obtaining the assent of the President of India. This State Act was, however, amended by Act 16 of 1974 and the President’s assent was received on 10th April, 1974. According to the provisions of the State Act the statute was brought into force by virtue of a notification with effect from 8-5-1974. The Act provided for the investigation in respect of a complaint of criminal misconduct against any ‘public man by a Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner of Inquiries appointed for this purpose. The word ‘public man’ had been given a specific connotation in s. 2(c) of the Act and clearly excluded a Government servant.

 

A CBI inquiry was instituted against the appellants who were alleged to have abused their official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab. As a result of the inquiry a prosecution was launched against the appellant under the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act. A FIR was recorded on 16th June, 1976 and four months later sanction under section 197 of the Code was granted by the Governor of Tamil Nadu for the prosecution of the appellant under sections 161[1], 468[2] and 471[3] of the IPC and Sec. 5(2) r/w Sec. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Corruption Act). Thereafter, the police submitted a charge sheet against the appellant for the offences mentioned above and alleged that the appellant had derived for himself pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs. 4 to Rs. 5 lakhs from Madenlal Gupta for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms. The case was registered before the Special Judge and the necessary copies of the records were furnished to the appellant.

 

Then an application for discharging him was filed by him under the Sec. 239 of the Code before the Special Judge but after hearing the counsel the Judge rejected the application and as a result the appellant again filled two applications under the High Court for quashing the proceedings and for setting aside the order of the Special Judge of not discharging him. The High Court also rejected his applications but granted him with the certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, thus he appeals before the Supreme Court.

 

Issues:

The appellant challenged the validity of the Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973, as amended by the Act 16 of 1974 on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Central Act and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and hence void. The state Act was passed after obtaining the assent of the President. The State Act repealed and the question arose whether action could be taken under the Central Laws i.e. the IPC, the Corruption Act and Criminal Law Amendment. The appellant contended that even though the State Act was repealed it was repugnant to the Central Laws, i.e. the IPC and the Corruption Act. It was argued that by virtue of Art. 254 (2) the provision the Central Act stood repealed and could not be revived after the State Act was repealed. Thus the question before the court was whether there was any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act and that the provisions of the Central Act stood repealed and unless re-enacted could not be invoked even after the state Act was itself repealed.

Contentions:

Mr Venu Gopal, learned counsel for the appellant has raised only two points before the Court.

In the first place, he submitted that even though the State Act was repealed on 6-9-1977 during the time that it was in force, it was wholly repugnant to the provisions of the Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act and by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India the provisions of the aforesaid Central Acts stood repealed and could not revive after the State Act was repealed. The constitutional position, it is submitted, was that even though the State Act was repealed the provisions of the Central Acts having themselves been protanto repealed by the State Act when it was passed could not be pressed into service for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant unless those provisions were re-enacted by the appropriate legislature. A number of grounds were raised by counsel for the appellant in support of the first plank of his argument that the State Act was repugnant to the provisions of the Central Acts as a result of which the former was rendered void.

 

Secondly, it was argued that even assuming that the State Act has ceased to exist and the Central Acts apply to the facts of the present case, the appellant cannot be prosecuted under any of the Sections of the Penal Code or the Corruption Act, because being the Chief Minister of the State at the relevant time he was not a public servant as defined in section 21 clause (12) of the Indian Penal Code. The argument was that by virtue of the position that the appellant enjoyed as Chief Minister there was no relationship of master and servant between him and the Government and he was acting as a constitutional functionary and, therefore, could not be described as a public servant as contemplated by section 21(12) of the Penal Code.

 

Judgement:

The Supreme Court held that the State Act was not repugnant to the Central Acts and therefore it did not repeal the Central Act which continued to be in operation even after the repeal of the State Act creates distinct and separate offences with different ingredients and different punishments and does not in any way collide with the Central Acts. The State Act is rather a complimentary Act to the Central Act. The State Act itself permits the Central Acts to come to its aid after an investigation is completed and a report is submitted. The State Act provides that the ‘public man’ will have to be prosecuted under the Central Acts.

The question of repugnancy between the Parliamentary legislations and State legislation arises in two ways. First, where the legislations are enacted with respect to matters allotted in their fields but they overlap and conflict. Second, where the two legislations are with respect to the matters in the concurrent list and there is a conflict. In both the situations, the Parliamentary legislation will predominate, in the first by virtue of non-obstacle clause in Article 246 (1)[4] and in the second by reason of Article 254 (1)[5].

In Deep Chand v. State of U.P[6]., the validity of U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act was involved. By this Act the State Government was authorised to make the scheme for nationalisation of Motor Transport in the state. The law was necessitated because the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 did not contain any provision for the nationalisation of Motor Transport Services. Later on, in 1956 the Parliament with a view to introduce a uniform law amended the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, and added a new provision enabling the State Government to frame rules of nationalisation of Motor Transport. The Court held that since both the Union Law and the State Law occupied the same field, the State Law was void to the extent of repugnancy to Union Law.

 

Conclusion:

After the study of this case and Doctrine of repugnancy it can be concluded that the repugnancy generally arises when

  1. there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act,
  2. such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable and
  3. the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. It can also be said that in situations where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy. In situation where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254. Therefore Article 254 (2) is an exception where the State law prevails in situation of conflict between State and Central law.

 

 

[1] Sec.161, Indian Penal Code, “Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act”.

[2]  Sec.468, Indian Penal Code, 1860, “Forgery for purpose of cheating”.

[3]  Sec.471, Indian Penal Code, 1860, “Using as genuine a forged document”.

[4] Constitution of India, Art. 246 (1).

[5] Constitution of India, Art. 254 (1).

[6] 1959 AIR 648.

Case Comment On S.P. Mittal v. Union Of India

CASE COMMENT – S.P. MITTAL v. UNION OF INDIA:

UNFOLDING THE CONFLICT OF RELIGIOUS RIGHT

Written by Ankitashri Tripathi*, Shashank Shri Tripathi** & Harsh Yadav***

* 2nd Year B.Com LL.B Student, Institute Of Law, Nirma University

** 3rd Year B.A LL.B Student, Balaji Law College, Pune University

*** 2nd Year B.Com LL.B Student, Institute Of Law, Nirma University

 

INTRODUCTION

India being a secular country has tolerance for all the religions and this has been reflected from the decisions of our judiciary from time to time. Freedom of religion in India is a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 15 and Article 25 of the Constitution of India. Modern India came into existence in 1947 and the Indian constitution’s preamble was amended in 1976 to state that India is a secular state. But having right is not sufficient. There have been numerous conflict between various interest groups and law making bodies which will be dealt in the respective case analysis.

S.P. Mittal Etc. v. Union of India And Others (1982) 1983 AIR, 1 1983 SCR (1) 729

FACT

Sri Aurobindo was one of the India’s great sage and philosopher. After his career in politics and administration, he decided to convert his life into yoga and meditation at Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu. A French lady named Madam M. Alfassa, became his disciple and also later she known as Mother. Soon  after some time many people all over India and also from the abroad joined Sri Aurobindo and formed a society named Sri Aurobindo Society in 1960 under West Bengal Registration of Societies Act 1961.After some years a new township was formed known as AUROVILLE where people were taught he teachings of Sri Aurobindo .Seeing a unique work state and central government decided to provide funds to the township  .As a result of it the UNESCO  also decided to help this township in its development because it was helpful in international relation.

In year 1970,after the death of Mother Alfassa there were lots of cases registered against the misappropriation of funds in the township .Seeing such a conflict Central government decided to take over the power of administration in its hands, for which legislation passwd a Presidential Ordinance . After some time by filing a writ, that ordinance was converted into Auroville Emergency Provision Act 1980. The same was challenged before Supreme Court of India.

ISSUES RAISED

The constitutional validity of the Act has been challenged on four grounds:

  1. Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the impugned statute;
  2. The impugned Act infringes Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution;
  3. The impugned Act is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution; and
  4. The act was mala fide.

 

JUDGEMENT

In the judgement given by the court, Supreme Court firstly defined the powers of the parliament[1] where judgement is-

1.      The Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980.2.      The subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Even if the subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered by any specific entry of List I or III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution it would in any case be covered by the residuary entry 97 of List I.3.      The function of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is not to confer powers .They merely demarcate the   legislative fields. Power   to   legislate is given to appropriate legislature by Articles 245 to 248 of the Constitution. 4.      The  Auroville  Act  even  incidentally  does not trench upon  the field covered by the West Bengal Societies Registration Act,  1961 as  it is  in no  way related to Constitution, regulation and winding up of the Society.

INTERPRETATION/COMMENT

Religion, undefined by the constitution, is incapable of precise judicial definition either. In the background of the provisions of the constitution and the light shed by judicial precedent, it can at best be said that religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief and doctrine.
The words “religious denomination” in Article 26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word ‘religion’ and if this be so, the expression “religious denomination” must also satisfy three conditions:

  1. It must be a collection of individuals who has a system of beliefs or doctrine which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
  2. Common organisation: and
  • Designation by a distinctive name.

Religion means a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being”. A religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well; Religion need not be theistic. The above contention was held in Sastri Yagnapurushadji and Ors. v. Muldas Bhudardos Vaishya and Anr.[2].

Religious denomination means a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name. A law which takes away the rights of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests in another authority would amount to violation of the right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 26. Madrasv. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar.[3]

Further the arguments raised cannot be accepted for two reasons-

Firstly, because it has not been pointed out which were the other institutions where similar situations were prevailing.

Besides, there is uniqueness with this institution inasmuch as the Government is also involved. Even a single institution may be taken as a class. The C: situation prevailing in the Auroville had converted the dream of the Mother into a nightmare. There had arisen acute law and order situation in the Auroville, numerous cases were pending against various foreigners, the funds meant for the Aurovillehad been diverted towards other purposes and the atmosphere was getting out of hand. In the circumstances the Government intervened and promulgated the ordinance and later on substituted it by the impugned enactment. It cannot be said that it is violative of Article 14 on that account.”

We get support for our view from the following decisions.

In Budhan Chowdhury v. The State of Bihar[4] a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court explained the true meaning and scope of Article 14 as follows:

It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.

These observations were quoted with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors.[5]

Judicial trend as so far as right to freedom of religion is concerned have evolved through the passage of time in terms of its definition and significance as it have always a subject to judicial interpretation. In Ananda Margi[6] case, the court differentiated between religion and religious denomination by upholding S.P Mittal v. UOI.

In Bijoe Emmanuel[7] case, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that religious faith must be followed by religious denomination in order to being protected by article 25 of Constitution of India.

In Church of God[8] case, the court held that there should be no violation of Article 25 and 26 have been caused. If a person has a fundamental right i.e. here, right to religion and he enforces it, it should be ensured that others right is not violated i.e. here, right to peaceful environment.

In Aruna Roy[9] case, the judiciary decided in the following case that there is a clear cut difference between religious instruction and religious education and teaching the philosophy of religion. You cannot bring each and every thing related to religion into religious instruction.

CONCLUSION

In the present case i.e., S. P Mittal v. Union of India, and various other cases discussed further the Supreme Court have led down the guidelines regarding the definition of “Religion” and “religious denominations”, where the approach of the court was very clear as to what should be considered religious denomination and what should not be. There were specific guidelines were led down for the Religious denomination.

However, the author concludes that the judicial trend regarding religious right have never been a predictable concern. A citizen can exercise his right to religious practice till when it is not harming other, but before that it is very necessary to understand that what is religion and what is not in order to claim ones right under fundamental right

 

 

 

[1]Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of India (1970) 1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530.

[2] [1966]3SCR242.

[3] [1954]1SCR1005.

[4] AIR 191, 1955 SCR (1)1045.

[5] AIR 538, 1959 SCR 279.

[6]Acharya Jagdishwaranand v. Commissioner Of Police (1984) AIR 512, 1984 SCR (1) 447.

[7]Bijoe Emmanuel &Ors v. State Of Kerala & Ors (1987) AIR 748, 1986 SCR (3) 518.

[8]Church of God v.  K.K.R.M.C Welfare Association (2000) AIR 2773.

[9]Ms. Aruna Roy &Ors v. Union Of India &Ors, 2002 RD-SC 388 (2002).